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ESSAY
TRUMP UNIVERSITY AND PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT
Christopher L. Peterson *
Donald J. Trump (“Trump”), the Republican Party’s 2016 nominee for
President of the United States, currently faces three lawsuits accusing him
of fraud, false advertising, and racketeering. These ongoing cases focus on a
series of wealth seminars Trump called “Trump University” which collected
over $40 million from consumers seeking to learn Trump’s real estate
investing strategies. Although these consumer protection cases are civil
proceedings, the underlying legal elements in several counts plaintiffs seek
to prove run parallel to the legal elements of serious crimes under both state
and federal law. Somehow in the cacophony of the 2016 presidential
campaign, no legal academic has yet turned to the question of whether
Trump’s alleged behavior would, if proven, rise to the level of impeachable
offenses under the impeachment clause of the United States Constitution.
Addressing this issue of public concern, this essay provides a legal
analysis exploring whether the United States House of Representatives
could lawfully impeach and the Senate could convict a President Trump for
fraud and racketeering in connection with Trump University. In the sections
that follow, I first provide a summary of the evidence assembled in the three
pending Trump University civil lawsuits. Part two describes the legal claims
involved in each matter. Part three briefly summarizes the applicable law of
presidential impeachment under the United States Constitution and analyzes
whether Trump’s actions in connection with Trump University are
impeachable offenses. And finally, I offer concluding thoughts, considering
in particular the policy implications of a major presidential candidacy with
simultaneously pending legal complaints of fraud and racketeering.
I.

TRUMP UNIVERSITY BUSINESS PRACTICES

A. “Every single resource Mr. Trump has at his disposal”
Trump University opened to much fanfare in a press conference at
Trump’s Manhattan corporate offices in 2005. 1 In a promotional video
Trump explained: “At Trump University, we teach success. That’s what it’s
* John J. Flynn Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. The
author wishes to thank the following for helpful conversations, comments, encouragement,
research assistance, and/or suggestions: Robert Adler, Paul Cassell, Tera Peterson, Jeff
Schwartz, and Spencer Witt.
1 DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, THE MAKING OF DONALD TRUMP 117-18 (2016).
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all about—success. It’s going to happen to you.” 2 Similar to elite private
Universities, Trump University had a vintage trademark featuring a British
heraldic lion. But, unlike other Universities, Trump University did not have
a campus, grade students, or offer degrees. Reflecting its unorthodox roots,
early press descriptions of the Trump’s new school explained that
“[c]ourses will cost $300 and will take one to two weeks to complete.” 3
Advertising for Trump University focused almost exclusively on Trump’s
role in developing the curriculum and selecting the instructors. As a narrator
explained in the promotional video, “Donald trump is without question the
world’s most famous business man. As a real estate developer he has
reshaped the New York skyline with some of that great city’s most
prestigious and elegant buildings. Now Donald Trump brings his years of
experience to the world of business education with the launch of Trump
University.” 4 One newspaper advertisement extoled:
He’s the most celebrated entrepreneur on earth. He’s earned
more in a day than most people do in a lifetime. He’s living a
life many men and women only dream about. And now he’s
ready to share—with Americans like you—the Trump process
for investing in today’s once-in-a-lifetime real estate market. 5
Trump University distributed similarly breathless marketing materials
including newspaper ads and direct mail solicitation letters—all with large
color photographs of a smiling Donald Trump in suit and tie—in cities
across the country.
Capitalizing on Trump’s name recognition, Trump University
advertisements emphasized that Trump himself “handpicked” Trump
University instructors and taught Trump’s own real estate strategies,
techniques, and “Secrets of Real Estate Marketing.” 6 Trump University
staff were trained to “[t]ake every opportunity to emphasize that they need
to learn the Trump way for continued and growing success!” 7 Instructors
often boasted of having close personal relationships with Trump. 8
Advertisements reinforced these claims by, for example, quoting Trump
claiming that “I can turn anyone into a successful real estate investor,

2

Trump University Intro, Youtube.com (Uploaded on Dec 5, 2009)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvaaeHP9xtQ.
3 Trump University Founded for Student ‘Customers’, FORBES (May 23, 2005),
http://www.forbes.com/2005/05/23/0523autofacescan06.html.
4
Trump University Intro, Youtube.com (Uploaded on Dec 5, 2009)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvaaeHP9xtQ.
5 See, e.g., Advertisement: The Time to invest in Texas Real Estate is NOW!, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (Sept. 24, 2009), B4.
6 Id.
7 TRUMP UNIVERSITY, PLAYBOOK 104, 109 (2010).
8 See, e.g., Affidavit of Nora Hana, Affirmation of Assistant Attorney General Tristan
C. Snell in Support of the Verified Petition, Exhibit K13, p. 1, New York v. Trump
Educational Initiative., LLC. (July 12, 2013) (“He said that he was Mr. Trump’s ‘right hand
man.’”) (hereinafter “Snell affirmation”).
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including you.” 9 Similarly, Trump explained, “We’re going to have
professors and adjunct professors that are absolutely terrific—terrific
people, terrific brains, successful. We are going to have the best of the best.
… These are all people that are handpicked by me.” 10 Trump continued,
“We’re going to teach you better than the business schools are going to
teach you, and I went to the best business school. We’re going to teach you
better. I think it’s going to be a better education and it’s going to teach you
what you know.” 11 A letter signed by Trump soliciting enrolment in Trump
University explained, “my hand-picked instructors will share my
techniques. which took my entire career to develop, Then just copy exactly
what I've done and get rich.” 12
Students intrigued by these promises began their Trump University
studies by attending widely marketed “free” 90-minute introductory classes.
Advertisements for these classes promised that students “will learn from
Donald Trump’s handpicked instructors a systematic method for investing
in real estate that anyone can use effectively. You’ll learn investing from
the inside out. You’ll learn how to finance your own deals using other
people’s money. You’ll learn how to overcome your fear of getting
started.” 13 However, the Trump University’s confidential employee training
manual, called the Trump University Playbook, explained that these 90minute seminars were not intended to actually teach anything. The goal of
these sessions, called previews in the Playbook, was to “set the hook” in
order to sell three-day seminars such as the Profit from Real Estate seminars
which cost $1,495.00. 14 The Playbook summarized the point of previews in
a heading: “The Preview Strategy—90 Minute Selling.” 15 The book
explains:
In a one-off selling situation, you are selling to someone who you
may or may not see again. You must form a connection in a one to
two hour period. And, it must start as soon as the future student
walks into the registration area in a preview scenario. The
prospective students must make an immediate decision, based on
the opportunity, brand, and the newly formed relationship, because
they have the most to lose by not making the decision. 16
Despite promising to teach “a systematic method for investing in real
estate” in advertisements, the Trump University Playbook specifically
9

HOUSTON CHRONICLE, supra, at B4.
Trump University Intro, Youtube.com (Uploaded on Dec 5, 2009)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvaaeHP9xtQ.
11 Id.
12 Letter of Donald J. Trump, Affirmation In Opposition to Respondent’s Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit FF, p. 409, New York v. Trump Educational Initiative.,
LLC. (June 3, 2016).
13 Snell Affirmation, supra, Exhibit E, p. 221.
14 PLAYBOOK, supra, at 6, 19.
15 Id. 98.
16 Id.
10
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instructed staff to “never imply [students] will learn a particular strategy at
the preview.” 17 Despite advertisements promising that “attendees receive a
FREE Secrets of Real Estate Marketing CD-Rom,” the Trump University
playbook instructed staff to “[n]ever distribute materials unless you have
some form of payment, as we want to use these as a sales tool.” 18 Trump
University staff were expected to “create a sense of urgency,” get “in a sales
mindset,” and be “ready to Sell, Sell, Sell!” 19
Thousands of students agreed to purchase three-day seminars. But, even
in these longer courses, the focus at Trump University remained squarely on
up-selling consumers to a more expensive, next level of service. Rather than
presenting a meaningful educational program, Trump’s three-day “Profit
from Real-Estate Workshop” was, in the words of the Trump University’s
business handbook, a: “sales environment.” 20 Sales practices at each
seminar were systematically designed, painstakingly choreographed, and
implemented ruthlessly. Although in the 90-minute sessions students were
promised that the three-day seminars would teach them “everything we
needed to know about investing in real estate and about how to buy and sell
real estate using other people’s money,’ 21 instructors in the three-day
seminars said that mentorship programs “would be the only way to succeed
in real estate investment.” 22 Like the 90-minute sales pitch before it,
“teachers” in the three-day seminars were hired as independent contractors
and exclusively paid based on commissions from selling Trump elite
mentoring packages. 23
Posing as teachers, sales staff, were trained to manipulate students
emotions in order to sell expensive “Trump elite” packages. For example,
the Trump University Playbook explains “[t]he words ‘I noticed’ have a
powerful subconscious effect on people because they send a subliminal
message to them that they stood out in the crowd, that they are attractive or
charismatic or that they impressed you. It sends a message to the person that

17 Compare Advertisement: The Time to invest in Texas Real Estate is NOW!, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (Sept. 24, 2009), B4 with PLAYBOOK, supra, at 98.
18 Compare HOUSTON CHRONICLE, supra with PLAYBOOK, supra, at 117.
19 PLAYBOOK, supra, at 22, 110.
20 PLAYBOOK, supra, at 98.
21 Affidavit of Kathleen Meese, Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit K17, p. 1 (“We
were also told that at the three-day seminar we would get to have our pictures taken with
Donald Trump. It ended up being a cardboard cutout of Mr. Trump.”); Third Amended Class
Action Complaint, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 10-CV-940-IEG WVG, Doc. 128, at
35 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012) (quoting consumer complaint: “I was told that after taking the
first 3 day seminar, which cost $1,500 I could go out start making deals. . . . The only thing
they want you to do is sign up for the next seminar which can cost up to $35,000.”).
22 Affidavit of June Harris, Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit K14, p. 3.
23 Trump University Independent Contractor Agreement, p. 15; Verified Petition, New
York v. The Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC f/k/a Trump University LLC, N.Y. Sup. Ct.
¶ 92 (Aug. 24, 2016).
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you have interest in them. People love recognition and attention.” 24 These
manipulative sales tactics were carefully refined and iterated. 25 Indeed, to
avoid actual teaching, the sales team was instructed to pay “special
attention” to prevent “needy attendees” from asking questions during break
times that would prevent speaker from making more effective one-on-one
sales pitches to the most likely buyers. 26 Instead, Trump University trained
staff to find the emotional vulnerabilities of students and exploit those
vulnerabilities to sell additional Trump University packages. As the
Playbook explained, “[y]ou don’t sell products, benefits or solutions—you
sell feelings. . . [because] a sole focus on products leads to objections.”27
Trump University trained staff to use the three day seminars to pretend to
care about their students in order to establish the trust necessary to close
each sale: “[T]he critical factor is trust. You have three days to build a
relationship where a student accepts you will always keep their best
interests at heart.” 28
Trump University established this trust in order to take as much money
as possible from each of their students. Beginning at registration Trump
University staff would take photographs of every student. The purpose of
the photograph was to design one-on-one sales portfolios of each student
that would allow staff to make more effectively sales pitches. 29 Using the
justification of providing personal financial advice, Trump University
would also extract detailed financial information from each student. The
real purpose obtaining this information was to discover the student’s
liquidity so instructors could more effectively sell expensive “Trump Elite”
“Bronze,” “Silver,” and “Gold” packages that cost $8,995.00, $19,495.00,
and $34,995.00 respectively. 30 The Trump University Playbook explained
that during the first evening of each three-day seminar:
[T]he team should go through each profile and determine who has
the most and least liquid assets and rank them using the following
scale:
E1 – Over $35,000 of liquid assets
E2 – Between $20,000 and $30,000 of liquid assets
E3 – Under $10,000 of liquid assets
24 PLAYBOOK, supra, at 100 (“We also have the advantage of testing the question out on

hundreds of people and adjusting it to increase our chances for a desirable response. The
attendee does not have the luxury of “practicing” his or her answer.”).
25 PLAYBOOK, supra, at 99.
26 PLAYBOOK, supra, at 37, 39. See also Third Amended Class Action Complaint,
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 10-CV-940-IEG WVG, Doc. 128, at 35 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
26, 2012) (quoting consumer complaint: “What a SCAM I attended the three day seminar
and really learned very, very little. [Their] goal is to talk you into joining the next seminar,
which can cost up to 35,000. They use almost Gestapo tactics to sign for this seminar . . . .
Any questions you ask are never answered.”).
27 PLAYBOOK, supra, at 100.
28 Id. at 99.
29 Id. at 32.
30 Id. at 9-10.
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E4 – Less than $2,000 of liquid assets.” 31
Ranking students from top to bottom by assets allowed sales staff to target
the consumer with the most expensive package each consumer could
possibly pay for. 32
An important part of the three-day seminar was convincing students to
call their credit card companies to increase their credit limits. Instructors
characterized this part of the training as a way to increase the ability of the
students to obtain funds to purchase real estate. 33 However, the real purpose
of the activity was to ensure that three-day seminar students would have
enough liquidity to purchase “Trump elite” mentorship packages at the end
of the seminar. As a student named Wilma Fisher explained:
[T]he Trump speakers encouraged us to call our credit card
companies to request that our credit limits be increased. The Trump
speakers said that we would need the extra capital for real estate
investment, but in reality they just wanted us to have more money
available for extremely expensive mentorship programs. Those
who were successful in having their credit card limits increased
were celebrated and cheered by the Trump staff like they had just
been induced into a fraternity. 34
Ms. Fisher’s explanation is corroborated by the Trump University Sales
Playbook which trained employees to sell mentoring programs to students
no matter how dire their financial situation. Trump University relied on
sales scripts to train Trump University staff to ignore and overcome
students’ resistance to maxing out their credit cards to pay for more Trump
University services. 35 According to the Trump University Playbook:
“Money is never a reason for not enrolling in Trump University; if they
really believe in you and your product, they will find the money. You are
not doing any favor by letting someone use lack of money as an excuse.”36
31

Id. at 36.
Id. (“When you introduce the price, don’t make it sound like you think it’s a lot of
money, if you don’t make a big deal out of it they won’t. If they can afford the gold elite
don’t allow them to think about doing anything besides the gold elite.”).
33 See, e.g., Affidavit of Robert Jones, Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit K15, p. 2
(“During the three-day seminar, there was very strong pressure to sign up for one of Trump’s
mentorship programs. Towards the end of the course, the speakers told us to increase our
credit limits so that we could use our credit cards to pay for the advanced Trump Elite
course.”).
34 Affidavit of Wilma Fisher, Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit K9, p. 2.
35 PLAYBOOK, supra, at 112-13 (sales script reading: “I see, do you like living paycheck
to paycheck? Do you like just getting by in life? Do you enjoy seeing everyone else but
yourself in their dream houses and driving their dreams cars with huge checking accounts?
Those people saw an opportunity, and didn’t make excuses, like what you’re doing now.”).
36 PLAYBOOK, supra, at 99. Compare Third Amended Class Action Complaint, Makaeff
v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 10-CV-940-IEG WVG, Doc. 128, at 35 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012)
(quoting consumer complaint: “Trump University and their staff should be ashamed of
themselves! They RUINED my credit!!! They told me I would get my large investment back
in my first real estate deal because I would have access to amazing mentors and course
content. I did what they told me in all of the courses and it was nonsense!”).
32
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To this end, Trump University sales staff pressured families to mortgage
their homes and cash out their retirement funds to purchase Trump Elite
packages. 37 At the heart of every closing one-on-one sales pitch were sales
scripts that promised “every single resource Mr. Trump has at his disposal”
and “and most importantly a hand selected Trump certified multimillionaire mentor.” 38 These appeals to Trump’s judgment and expertise
were effective in convincing thousands of consumers to purchase “Trump
Elite” mentoring packages that cost, in some cases, more than the entire
annual salary of typical employees at one of Trump’s Casinos. 39
B. “Phantom Mentors”
After the excitement of the high-intensity Trump University sales
pitches wore off, many customers became upset, demanded refunds, and
submitted complaints to the Better Business Bureau, state Attorneys
General, and the Federal Trade Commission. Customers complained that
Trump University newspaper advertisements, direct mail letters, and the 90minute sales pitches for the three-day seminars were false or misleading. In
one typical example, a consumer complained to the New York State
Education Department: “I responded to a free workshop from Donald
Trump University. At the workshop, they sold me on taking the next step to
further my real estate education. At the weekend seminar I went to ($995)
all they did was try to sell me the next package for $35K. I paid $999 and a
weekend of my life to hear a long pitch.” 40 Former Trump University
students complained so frequently, that the Better Business Bureau
eventually lowered the Trump University’s ratings. The BBB itself
explained: “During the period when Trump University appeared to be active
in the marketplace, BBB received multiple customer complaints about this
business. These complaints affected the Trump University BBB rating,
which was as low as D- in 2010.” 41
While complaints about Trump University three day seminars were
common, it was the students that purchased costly mentoring packages that
suffered most. Despite paying as much as $35,000, consumer complaints
against Trump University reveal that many purchasers of Trump Elite

37

Affidavit of Nora Hana, Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit K13, p. 2.
PLAYBOOK, supra, at 129.
39
Blackjack Dealer Salaries in Atlantic City, New Jersey (September 20, 2016),
http://www1.salary.com/NJ/Atlantic-City/Blackjack-Dealer-salary.html (reporting a median
annual Blackjack Dealer salary in Atlantic City, NJ of $17,259, as of August 29, 2016).
40 Complaint of Daniel Rivera, New York State Education Department, reprinted in
Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit L36, p. 3.
41Statement by the Better Business Bureau Servicing Metropolitan New York and the
Council of Better Business Bureaus (March 8, 2016) http://www.bbb.org/council/newsevents/news-releases/2016/03/statement-by-better-business-bureau-serving-metropolitannew-york-and-council-of-better-business-bureaus/.
38

8
mentoring packages did not receive meaningful real estate mentoring.
Consumers complained that Trump University’s “Trump Elite” mentors:
• Did not return phone calls;
• Set up voicemail inboxes that did not accept messages;
• Were inexperienced or could not provide useful advice;
• Advised students to engage in illegal practices;
• Blamed students for their inability to make money;
• Frequently delayed or refused to provide refunds despite
promised “guarantees.” 42
Many Trump University students lost their life savings or were forced into
bankruptcy by their expenditures on the Trump University’s “phantom
mentors.” 43 For example, Trump University took thousands of dollars from
a divorced, unemployed Seattle, Washington woman who was suffering
from multiple sclerosis and a recent stroke. Even though she had no
experience in real estate, instructors encouraged her to max out her credit
cards to invest in more classes. When she filed a complaint with the Federal
Trade Commission, she wrote "I wanted to depend on me, not my
government, [but] I don't understand how they can take my money and not
help me . . . ." 44
Another New York customer explained: “My entire ‘mentorship’ with
[my Trump University mentor] consisted of three telephone conversations.
… I wasted my entire life savings on Trump. I spent $1,495 on the Trump
three-day seminar and $24,995 on the Trump Gold Elite mentorship
package only to be demeaned and belittled. I feel like such a fool. Trump
did not help me with my real estate investment questions. Nor did I learn
anything of application to other real estate transactions. My finances
deteriorated significantly and I was left insolvent by Trump University” 45
Many complaints suggest that Trump University particularly targeted
older Americans. For example, the adult child of one consumer complained:
This is the biggest SCAM I’ve ever seen! My 82 year old father
went to a free seminar promising to make him rich through real
estate. The seminar was solely for the purpose of upselling him into
attending a $1500 three day workshop by promising him they
would teach him how to buy and sell foreclosures for huge profits .
. . [H]e goes to the 3 day workshop and when he comes home we
42 Request for Approval to File, Consumer Protection and Public Health Division,
Houston Regional Office, Office of Texas Attorney General (May 6, 2010); Affidavit of
Nelly Cunningham, Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit K6, pp. 3-4. See also PLAYBOOK,
supra, at 114 (“Mr. Trump won’t listen to excuses and neither will we. Excuses will never
make you more money; they will just continue to cost you more missed opportunities in
life.”).
43
Letter from Louis Piatt to Trump Organization, in Snell Affirmation, supra, at
Exhibit L32.
44 Consumer Sentinel Network Complaint, No. 30938978, Snell Affirmation, supra, at
Exhibit L39.
45 Affidavit of Nelly Cunningham, Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit K6, pp. 3-4.
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find out that they pressured him into spending $35k MORE! . . .
Then he proceeds to tell us how the majority of people there were
SENIORS like him! These aren’t long term investors here, these
are people being tricked into thinking they can make a quick profit!
If this isn’t the definition of preying on the elderly then I don’t
know what is. 46
Another student explained to a Trump University instructor that she
could not afford to purchase the Trump Gold Elite mentoring package
because she needed her resources to care for her child with Down’s
Syndrome. The Trump University instructor persuaded the mother to buy
the Trump Gold Elite mentoring package by guaranteeing that she would
make back her $25,000 in sixty days. The instructor promised her that the
he would be her personal mentor, that she could make unlimited calls to him
for life, and that she would receive valuable real estate leads, legal forms,
and lifetime access to Trump University webinars. But, after the mother
agreed to buy the mentoring package, Trump University substituted a
different mentor who blamed her for being unprepared and did not provide
any useful advice. Eventually all the phone numbers she received were
disconnected and none of the real estate leads, legal forms or lifetime access
to webinars were provided. Despite asking for a refund, she explained:
I was unable to get my refund and am still paying off my debts
from Trump tuition. Donald Trump received $25,000 of my money.
For $25,000, I have received a lifetime membership to nothing! No
one contacted me and I have not been able to contact anyone
because the phone numbers have all been disconnected. There is no
Trump University.” 47
Far from unusual, consumers filed complaints like these with the Better
Business Bureau, law enforcement offices in at least eleven states, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the U.S. Department of Justice. 48
II. FRAUD, RACKETEERING, AND TRUMP UNIVERSITY
When officials in Trump’s home state of New York inevitably began
looking into these consumer complaints, they quickly discovered that
Trump University did not meet even the most basic labeling and licensing
requirements of the state. In many jurisdictions it is common for the names
of certain business types to be reserved for only those businesses that meet
specific legal criteria. For example, a barber shop is not legally entitled to
call itself a bank. In New York, the state legislature adopted laws that
restrict the use of the word “University” to only those institutions
46 Complaint, Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC., Case 3:10-cv-00940-CAB-WVG, p.

37 (S.D. Cal September 26, 2012) (quoting http://www.moneystance.com/trump-universityreviews).
47 Affidavit of Kathleen Meese, Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit K6, p 5.
48 Complaint, Cohen v. Trump, Case 3:13-cv-02519-DMS-RBB, at ¶ 50 (S.D. Cal.
October 18, 2013).
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designated by the New York Board of Regents or have a private university
charter from the legislature. 49 Trump unambiguously violated New York
law by naming a “university” after himself.
In addition to its illegal name, New York law provided that “no private
school which charges tuition or fees related to instruction . . . shall be
operated by any person . . . for the purpose of teaching or giving instruction
in any subject or subjects, unless it is licensed by the Department [of
Education].” 50 The purpose of this law is to allow the state Department of
Education to monitor teaching quality and protect vulnerable students.
Trump never bothered to obtain a license and illegally used independent
contractors for solicitation, unlicensed teachers, and an unlicensed school
director—all of which were obvious violations of New York Law. 51 When
New York officials wrote to Trump himself explaining how he was
operating an illegally named and unlicensed for-profit school, he refused to
change the name and simply ignored authorities for nearly five years. 52
After exercising considerable patience, the New York Attorney General
eventually sued to enforce state law.
A. The People of the State of New York v. The Trump Entrepreneur
Initiative, LLC f/k/a/ Trump University
While the New York Attorney General’s complaint included counts
directed at the licensing and labeling violations, it was the first and most
prominently featured count that captured the headlines in August of 2013:
Fraud. 53 The New York Court of Appeals has explained that, “[t]he elements
of a cause of action for fraud require [1] a material misrepresentation of a
fact, [2] knowledge of its falsity, [3] an intent to induce reliance, [4]
justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and [5] damages.” 54 Fraud is both a crime
and a civil tort. In most states the Attorney General has the discretion to
attack fraud either by charging the fraudster with a crime or suing civilly.
49

N.Y. Education Law § 224(a) (“No individual . . . not holding university, college or
other degree conferring powers by special charter from the legislature . . . , shall . . . use,
advertise or transact business under the name university . . . unless the right to do so shall
have been granted by the regents . . . .”).
50 N.Y. Educ. Law §5001(1).
51 N.Y. Educ. Law§ 5001-5010.
52 Matter of People by Schneiderman v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 137
A.D.3d 409, 410, 26 N.Y.S.3d 66, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (“By letter dated May 27, 2005,
the New York State Department of Education (SED) notified Donald Trump individually,
Sexton, and Trump University that they were violating the New York Education Law by
using the word “University” when it was not actually chartered as one.”).
53 Michael Gormley, N.Y. AG sues Trump, ‘Trump University,’ claims fraud, USA
TODAY
(August
26,
2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/24/trump-university-fraudny/2696367/.
54 Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 559, 910 N.E.2d
976 (2009).
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Both approaches have benefits and drawbacks. Prosecuting fraud as a crime
requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” while a civil case only requires
proof by a “preponderance of the evidence”—a lower burden of proof.
Moreover, successfully prosecuting fraud as a crime can sometimes leave
the incarcerated defendant without resources to actually repay victims and
can also take much longer to bring the defendant to trial. But even in civil
fraud cases, courts routinely dismiss fraud allegations if the accusations are
conclusory or do not point to particular facts or circumstances justifying the
case. 55 To survive a motion to dismiss, “averments of fraud must be
accompanied by the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the misconduct
charged. 56
In the state of New York’s case against Trump, the top law enforcement
officer in New York accused Trump University of making the following
material misrepresentations in their marketing:
• consumers would learn “everything [they] need[ed] to know”
to become successful real estate investors;
• consumers would quickly recoup their investment by doing real
estate deals, with some instructors claiming that consumers
would earn tens of thousands of dollars within thirty days;
• instructors were “handpicked” by Donald Trump;
• consumers would be taught Donald Trump’s very own real
estate strategies and techniques;
• consumers would receive access to private sources of financing
(“hard money lenders”); and
• the three-day seminar would include a year-long
“Apprenticeship Support” program. 57
Although Trump and Trump University have aggressively litigated the
New York Attorney General’s case for over the three years, Trump has lost
on almost every important issue so far. Trump’s initial litigation strategy
was to seek dismissal of the case because the claims were too old, 58
because there were fine print disclosures that disclaimed any responsibility
for false representations, 59 and to argue that Trump himself could not be
held accountable for the alleged fraud and violations committed by Trump
University. 60 Trump also filed a counter-suit claiming that the New York
Attorney General’s office was harassing him with a malicious prosecution
55

Id.

56 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 10CV0940-IEG WVG, 2011 WL 1872886, at *3

(S.D. Cal. May 16, 2011).
57 Press Release, A.G. Schneiderman Sues Donald Trump, Trump University & Michael
Sexton for Defrauding Consumers Out of $40 Million with Sham “University” (August 25,
2013), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-sues-donald-trump-trumpuniversity-michael-sexton-defrauding-consumers.
58 Trump Respondent’s Affirmation in Support of Motion to Dismiss, New York v.
Trump, Index No. 451463/2013, p. 3 (October 31, 2013).
59 Id. at 13.
60 Id. at 62-63.
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and asking for $100,000,000 in damages. 61 While some of the alleged
illegal activity occurred before the applicable statute of limitations, much of
it—included alleged fraud—did not. 62 The trial judge dismissed Trump’s
malicious prosecution counterclaim as premature and baseless. 63 The Court
also refused to resolve the case through summary judgment. 64 Following
Trump’s unsuccessful appeal which allowed the Attorney General’s fraud
claim to proceed, the parties are attempting to resolve several ongoing
discovery disputes. 65 Importantly, barring settlement, it appears that the
New York Attorney General’s Office now has no major procedural hurdles
remaining before bringing Trump to trial for fraud.
B. Low v. Trump University, LLC and Cohen v. Trump University,
LLC
Private litigants first sued Trump and Trump University in 2010. 66 The
initial complaint listed over ten different consumer protection violations
including violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, False
advertising, breach of contract, Financial Elder Abuse in violation of
California law, and fraud. 67 The parties have aggressively litigated the Low
v. Trump for nearly six years. Similar to the New York litigation, Trump’s
early efforts to fight the case included a suing his former student accusing
her of defamation. Trump’s countersuit spawned extensive litigation which
proceeded alongside the original case. Eventually, after an appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the district court struck
Trump’s defamation counterclaim and awarded attorney fees and costs to
the student. 68 The attorneys for the student expended nearly three quarters
of a million dollars in defending against Trump’s defamation claim—all of
61 Trump Respondent’s Verified Answer with Counterclaim to the Petition, New York
v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative, Index No. 451463/2013, p. 70 (March 3, 2014).
62 New York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative, 26 N.Y.S.3d 66, 73 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t
2016).
63 New York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative, 2014 WL 5241483, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op.
32685, *14-*15 (Sup. Ct. October 8, 2014).
64 New York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative, 2014 WL 5241483, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op.
32685 (Sup. Ct. October 8, 2014). Trump did succeed eliminating the N.Y. Attorney General
Office’s claim for violations of the Federal Trade Commission’s three-day rescission notice
rule on the grounds that the this illegal activity occurred more than three years prior to filing.
Id.
65 New York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative, 26 N.Y.S.3d 66, 73 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t
2016).
66 Class Action Complaint, Makaeff v. Trump University, 3:10-cv-00940-GPC-WVG,
Doc. 1 (S.D. Cal. April 30, 1010).
67 See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 10-CV-940-IEG WVG, 2010 WL 3988684,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010). The plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add claims
relating to Florida residents. Third Amended Class Action Complaint, Makaeff v. Trump
Univ., LLC, No. 10-CV-940-IEG WVG, Doc. 128, at 78-80 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012).
68 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1014 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
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which Trump was ordered to repay. 69 Trump’s other efforts to extinguish
the case have also failed. Among the three most important milestones in the
six year saga were, first, the district court’s order preserving most of the
consumers’ counts over Trump’s motion to dismiss. 70 Second, the
certification of a class action for all consumers that purchased a Trump
University three-day seminar or “Elite” program in California, New York
and Florida. 71And third, the denial of Trump’s motion for summary
judgment on a variety of state consumer protection claims that include
statutory fraud counts such as California’s financial abuse of the elderly
statute and Florida’s misleading advertising law. 72
Unlike many private consumer protection lawsuits which often
gradually lose steam, the Trump University claims have become
increasingly serious as plaintiffs amassed additional evidence and prevailed
in various motions. Most notably, in 2013 consumers’ counsel in the Low
litigation filed a second, related lawsuit called Cohen v. Trump University.
The Cohen case pleaded a single claim: Racketeering. The Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) is a federal statute that
provides criminal penalties and a private, civil right of action to stop corrupt
organizations from engaging in a pattern of illegal activity. Although
organized crime families figured prominently in legislative history of the
RICO statute, Congress enacted language applicable to any corrupt
organization that uses a pattern of specifically enumerated crimes. 73
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a RICO plaintiff must demonstrate
“(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity.” 74
A pattern of racketeering activity is defined as at least two instances of
any crime on a statutory list that includes murder, kidnapping, as well as
mail fraud and wire fraud. 75 The federal crimes of mail fraud and wire fraud
require a plaintiff to demonstrate two elements: “(1) having devised or
69 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 10CV0940 GPC WVG, 2015 WL 1579000, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2015) (“The Court AWARDS Makaeff fees in the amount of $790,083.40,
and costs in the amount of $8,695.81.”).
70
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 10-CV-940-IEG WVG, 2010 WL 3988684, at
*8-*9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010)
71 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-CV-0940-GPC-WVG, 2014 WL 688164, at
*20 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014).
72 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 145 F. Supp. 3d 962, 980-81 (S.D. Cal. 2015)
(“Financial abuse of an elder occurs when a defendant “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates,
obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder ... for a wrongful use or with intent to
defraud . . . .”). Although the plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of the common law fraud claim
in Low v. Trump, multiple remaining statutory counts require proof of the common law fraud
elements of fraud. See Id. at 81 (“Under the [Florida Misleading Advertising Law], the
plaintiff must ‘prove reliance on the alleged misleading advertising, as well as each of the
other elements of the common law tort of fraud in the inducement.’”).
73 S. Rep. No. 91-617 at 79.
74 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
75 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (5).
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intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent
acts), and (2) use of the mail [or wires] for the purpose of executing, or
attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified fraudulent acts).” 76 To show
a scheme to defraud, plaintiffs must generally present the same type of
evidence of fraud normally at issue in any common law tort claim or state
criminal prosecution. Importantly, plaintiffs’ evidence must show deceit
“coupled with a contemplated harm to the victim.” 77 Nevertheless, “[t]he
requisite intent under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes may be
inferred from the totality of the circumstances and need not be proven by
direct evidence.” 78 Prosecutors (and civil plaintiffs pleading predicate RICO
violations) can argue that a defendant’s intent may be inferred “from
statements and conduct” 79 as well as “from the modus operandi of the
scheme.” 80 The intent to defraud can be established “if a representation is
made with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity” including the use of
“extravagant claims.” 81
In Cohen v. Trump a United States federal district judge has already
held that the plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of racketeering based on
multiple predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. 82 Judge Curiel held that
Trump was not entitled to summary judgment on his argument that Trump
did not engage in “conduct” within the meaning of RICO. 83 The Judge
pointed to Trump’s own deposition testimony indicating that Trump had
approved the allegedly fraudulent marketing materials. Moreover, unlike
some RICO cases where the alleged enterprise is informal, Trump was the
founder and majority owner of a Limited Liability Company—which surely
satisfies RICO’s enterprise definition. 84 With thousands of allegedly false
statements made to consumers in cities all across the country through a
variety of print, online, and direct mail representations, the plaintiffs in
Cohen can easily show a pattern of more than two misrepresentations. And
perhaps most importantly, Judge Curiel has already held that this evidence
raises triable issues of materiality and intent to deceive. 85 Moreover,
liability for racketeering in the case is not limited to Trump University.
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Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 n. 10 (1989).
United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994) (providing an example
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78 United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
918 (1980).
79 United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v.
Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
80 United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 n. 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
81 United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1982).
82 Cohen v. Trump, No. 3:13-CV-2519-GPC-WVG, 2016 WL 4098221, at *10 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 2, 2016).
83 Id. at *7.
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85 Id. at *7-*9
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Judge Curiel has specifically held that Trump himself is subject to a trial for
racketeering in his individual capacity. 86
In both litigation and in his electoral campaign, Trump’s foremost
talking point has been his claim that 98 percent of Trump University
students were satisfied. 87 However, Trump University did not use reliable
methods for evaluating instruction. Normal Universities use standard
procedures such as proctors or online survey methods to prevent faculty
from pressuring students or even simply throwing away negative
evaluations. The same Trump University staff that were being reviewed had
control over administering, collecting, and returning Trump University
evaluations. Students reported feeling pressured by Trump University staff
to give positive reviews. 88 Even though studies suggest students are less
comfortable giving negative feedback in non-anonymous reviews, Trump
University evaluation forms required students to include their names and
contact information. 89 Moreover, many of the most troubling allegations of
broken promises occurred after students filled out evaluation forms. Court
documents estimate that between 25 and 40 percent of paying Trump
University students eventually demanded their money back. 90 And, Trump’s
claims about Trump University’s self-proctored evaluations are hard to
reconcile with the Better Business Bureau’s independent “D-” rating. But
perhaps more importantly, Trump’s argument is legally irrelevant. It is not a
legally recognized defense to say that a victim of fraud was satisfied with
having been lied to. The evidence still remains that Trump and Trump
University lied to their customers and this was illegal whatever the
evaluation forms say.

86 Cohen v. Trump, No. 3:13-CV-2519-GPC-WVG, 2016 WL 4098221, at *10 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 2, 2016).
87 Trump Respondent’s Affirmation in Support of Motion to Dismiss, New York v.
Trump, Index No. 451463/2013, p. 10 (October 31, 2013); The Truth About Trump
University, http://www.98percentapproval.com/ (2016).
88 Affidavit of Roberto Guillo, Snell Affirmation, supra, at Exhibit K11, p. 221
(Presenters “pleaded for a favorable rating so that ‘Mr. Trump would invite [them] back to
do other retreats.’”).
89 Christopher J. Fries & R. James McNinch, Signed Versus Unsigned Student
Evaluations of Teaching: A Comparison, 31 TEACHING SOCIOLOGY 333, 334 (2003) (“[w]e
can conclude that asking students to sign evaluation forms leads to more positive ratings
across the board in all categories.”).
90 Julianna Goldman & Laura Strickler, Documents Reveal What Trump Actually Said
About
His
University,
CBS
NEWS
(Mar.
7,
2016,
7:46
AM)
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/elections-2016-donald-trump-university-lawsuits-courtdocuments-instructors/; Trump Dep. 432:17–24, Dec. 10, 2015, Cohen v. Trump, No. 3:13CV-2519-GPC-WVG, 2016 WL 4098221 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2016); Steven Brill, What the
Legal Battle Over Trump University Reveals About Its Founder, TIME (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://time.com/4101290/what-the-legal-battle-over-trump-university-reveals-about-itsfounder/.
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III. PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT FOR HIGH CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS
The U.S. Constitution provides for impeachment of the President in
Article 2 Section 4 which reads:
The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors. 91
Authority to initiate impeachment proceedings rests exclusively with the
U.S. House of Representatives. 92 The Senate is sole power allowed to try all
impeachments. 93 No person may be removed from office through
conviction by the Senate without concurrence of two thirds of the senators
present. 94 When the President is on trial, the Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court presides. 95
A. Fraud and Racketeering Constitute Impeachable “High Crimes or
Misdemeanors”
Fraud and racketeering are legally recognized as serious felonies in all
fifty states. For example, in New York, where Trump currently faces
pending allegations of fraud:
A person is guilty of a scheme to defraud in the first degree when he
. . . engages in a scheme constituting a systematic ongoing course of
conduct with intent to defraud ten or more persons or to obtain
property from ten or more persons by false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations or promises, and so obtains property from one or
more of such persons . . . . 96
First degree fraud is a class E felony in New York and is punishable by
imprisonment for up to four years. 97
Similarly, under federal law mail fraud and wire fraud are serious
felonies. The United States Code states that:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, . . . places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail . . . any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, . . . shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 98
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While Trump currently faces allegations of mail and wire fraud as predicate
RICO offenses in Cohen v. Trump, RICO violations are also serious crimes
in and of themselves. Under the RICO: “[w]hoever violates any provision of
section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years.” 99
The history of federal impeachment has seen much debate over whether
a variety of unethical or illegal conduct rises to the level of a high crime or
misdemeanor. 100 Sometimes both Congress and commentators have taken a
broader view of high crimes and misdemeanors that permits impeachment
for activity that includes “abuses of office” that are not criminal especially
with respect to federal judges. 101 Some have also argued against a plain
reading of the words “high crimes and misdemeanors” in favor of the view
that only crimes relating to an official’s public office are impeachable.102
Thus, during the Watergate scandal, the House Judiciary Committee voted
against impeaching President Nixon on judicially untested allegations of
tax fraud. 103
However, the most plain reading of the phrase “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” is simply that impeachable behavior “is only that which
would subject an ordinary person to criminal indictment and
prosecution.” 104 The founders themselves dedicated significant debate to the
precise formulation of impeachable offenses amending the text of the
Constitution several times before arriving at the phrase “treason, bribery, or
other high crimes and misdemeanors.” 105 An earlier draft of the Constitution
allowed impeachment for “high crimes and misdemeanors against the
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18
United States.” 106 But, the fact that the phrase “against the United States”
was eventually eliminated suggests that the framers ultimately decided to
take a broader view of potentially impeachable high crimes. 107 Indeed the
breadth of this of the phrase inevitably leaves much to the wisdom and
judgment of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Despite historical
debate, as a matter of law it is clear that Congress would be well within its
prerogatives to impeach and remove a president for grave felonies—crimes
which are punishable by years in prison—such as fraud or racketeering.
To this end, the currently pending Trump University civil cases could
legally inform Congress on whether impeachment is justified. The law is
settled that civil lawsuits against Trump may continue to proceed while he
is in office. 108 Impeachment proceedings have never required prior criminal
conviction: Neither President Johnson, nor President Clinton were
convicted of crimes prior their impeachment. Indeed the Constitution
explicitly separates impeachment from criminal prosecution. Specifically,
Article I, Section 3 provides that:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of Honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment according to Law. 109
This separation of impeachment from other judicial proceedings arose from
an awareness of the long and bloody history of political tides in England.
The Framers wanted criminal prosecution separate from the political act of
removal from office through impeachment so “political passions could no
longer sweep an accused to his death.” 110
Thus, there is no clear legal hurdle that would prevent Congress from
beginning impeachment proceeding against Trump simply because the
currently pending cases arose in civil court. Most crimes also have a parallel
civil claim that allows victims to seek compensation. Fraud is, in this
respect, ordinary. And the fact that RICO is a relatively new criminal law—
it was adopted in 1970—is of no consequence. Nothing in the U.S.
Constitution’s impeachment provisions limits impeachable offenses to those
crimes that existed at the time of ratification.
Although civil cases for fraud and racketeering are put to a finder of
fact with a lower burden of proof, the underlying legal elements of these
criminal and civil cases are the same. With respect to RICO, Congress

106 MAX FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 551 (emphasis
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the Constitution does not afford the President temporary immunity from cases seeking civil
damages in litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office).
109 U.S. CONST. Art II, § 2.
110 BERGER, supra, at 58.
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adopted both criminal and civil sanctions under RICO because it recognized
the need for broad equitable remedies:
Where an organization is acquired or run by defined racketeering
methods, then the persons involved can be legally separated from
the organization, either by the criminal law approach . . . or through
a civil law approach of equitable relief broad enough to do all that
is necessary to free the channels of commerce from illicit
activity. 111
Congress would be well within its legal rights under the Constitution to
insist upon a President who is not a fraudster or a racketeer as defined in its
own laws.
B. Under the U.S. Constitution Impeachment is Permissible for Preincumbency Conduct
The plain language of the U.S. Constitution does not limit impeachable
offenses to actions that take place while the official is in office. In general,
“the words governing a text are of paramount concern, and what they
convey, in their context, is what the text means.” 112 And more particularly,
“[i]f the framers were minded to shield misconduct outside of office, they
knew well enough how to limit undesirable facets of ‘high crimes and
misdemeanors.’” 113 For example, the framers could have used the phrase
“corrupt, oppressive or other grave misconduct in office” instead of the
particular phrase they chose. 114 The Constitution says that Congress may
impeach and remove a president for “high crimes and misdemeanors” not
“high crimes and misdemeanors occurring in office.”
This plain reading of the Constitution also reflects the framers rejection
of George Mason’s proposal to permit impeachment for
“maladministration”—an act that by its nature must occur while the official
is in office. 115 On this point, Madison argued that allowing impeachment for
“so vague a term” as maladministration within office would place tenure of
the president “at the pleasure of the Senate.” 116 Instead, the framers selected
the still flexible, but more concrete reference to “high crimes.”

111 S. Rep. No. 91-617 at 79. See also G. Robert Blakey, The Rico Civil Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 348–49 (1982)
(arguing Congress intended an expansive reading of RICO in cases of fraud).
112 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 56 (2012).
113 BERGER, supra, at 206.
114 Id.
115 FARRAND, supra, at 550; BERGER, supra, at 78-79; Impeachment Inquiry Staff,
Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives, Constitutional Grounds
for Presidential Impeachment, in PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT: A DOCUMENTARY OVERVIEW
1, 11-12 (1974).
116 FARRAND, supra, at 550.
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The U.S. Constitution’s impeachment provisions are distinguishable in
this respect to impeachment provisions in many states. For example, the
Nebraska Constitution takes a different tack. In that state, “[a]ll civil
officers . . . shall be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in
office.” 117 But even in Nebraska, pre-incumbency conduct is relevant and
admissible in impeachment proceedings “to extent it bears upon the officer's
pattern of conduct and shows the officer's motives and intent as they relate
to the officer's conduct while in office.” 118
It is true that impeachment for pre-incumbency conduct is rare.
However, this may have more to do with the reluctance of the public to
elect those accused of high crimes or misdemeanors than any legal hurdle.
In normal election years, the public can generally be relied upon to vote
against fraudsters and racketeers. Nevertheless, there is some precedent in
state law for pre-incumbency impeachment articles, the most notable
example being Governor William Sulzer of New York. 119 Sulzer became
the only Governor of New York to be impeached and removed from office
after crossing Tammany Hall political bosses. 120 The Sulzer articles of
impeachment included allegations of filing of false statements of campaign
receipts and expenditures prior to taking office. 121 A month-long
impeachment trial before the state Senate ultimately convicted Sulzer on
three articles—two of which concerned pre-incumbency conduct. 122
Arguably the strongest argument against the legality of impeachment of
a President Trump is that the election would, in effect, serve as a
referendum on whether impeachment is appropriate. Nevertheless, there are
at least three arguments why the election would not legally preclude
Trump’s impeachment and removal. First, the plain language of the
Constitution reserves the rights of impeachment to the House and removal
to the Senate. These rights, like many others, are not provided to the public
in our representative form of government. If the country elects a president
117

Neb. Const. art. III, § 17. Article IV, § 5 (emphasis added).
Nebraska Legislature ex rel. State v. Hergert, 271 Neb. 976, 998, 720 N.W.2d 372,
391–92 (2006).
119
More recently, the Utah Legislature adopted a resolution to initiate impeachment
proceedings against a sitting state Attorney General for pre-incumbency conduct relating to
acts taken as an unelected deputy attorney general. House Resolution to Initiate
Impeachment or Investigation Proceedings Against Attorney General John Swallow, 2013
First Special Session, Utah House of Representatives (June 14, 2013).
120
Mathew Lifflander, The Only New York Governor Ever Impeached, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
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or vice president that has committed bribery, treason, or a high crime or
misdemeanor, then they do so at risk that the efficacy of their votes may be
impeded through impeachment and removal by their own elected
representatives. We can expect occasion for this scenario to be rare because
the public will generally vote against candidates with a track record of
impeachable offenses. After all, it is highly unusual for people with a record
of treason, bribery, or high crimes and misdemeanors to be elected. And, if
Representatives and Senators were to concoct false charges, they
themselves would be subject to losing their next elections for having flouted
the public will. But, while the legal power of pre-incumbency impeachment
is recondite, it nonetheless remains: the U.S. House and Senate may
impeach and remove a President that has committed bribery, treason, or a
high crime or misdemeanor—an election notwithstanding.
Second, the fact that Trump has attempted to publicly misrepresent the
facts and circumstances surrounding his alleged fraud and racketeering
should weigh in the calculus over whether impeachment for preincumbency crimes is appropriate. Just as Trump appears to have lied about
his role in Trump University to students, he has throughout the election
continued to misrepresent the cases that focus on his misrepresentations. 123
For example, he has attempted to deflect blame and tarnish the reputations
of those involved in the cases against him. Most notably, when Trump
suffered setbacks in private class action cases, Trump publicly criticized a
widely respected jurist claiming that it was the judge’s Mexican heritage
that caused his losses—rather than the evidence showing Trump’s sustained
pattern of deception. Similarly, when the New York Attorney General’s
Office sued him, Trump accused the New York Attorney General of bias
and political motives rather recognizing the evidence showing Trump
University’s failures. If Trump had apologized and accepted responsibility
for the alleged fraud and racketeering, the argument that the election served
as an effective referendum on the appropriateness of impeachment would be
more persuasive. As it stands, Trump’s own representations regarding the
case may have distorted the public view of whether Trump committed fraud
or racketeering. Under these circumstances, an argument sounding in the
nature of estoppel seems resonant: House Representatives and Senators
could reasonably argue Trump is estopped from claiming the election
precludes his impeachment so long as he continues to publically deny his
guilt.
Finally, in a real sense, the Trump University jury is still out. Currently,
all three cases appear to be headed to trial, but none have yet reached a
resolution on the merits. This fact deprives the public of the benefit of the
judicial system’s clear view on whether Trump did in fact engage in fraud
and racketeering. Our system relies primarily on fixed, periodic elections to
123
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resolve political differences. The Founders never intended for the use of
impeachment as a tool for removing officers or judges with whom Congress
has policy disagreements. Still, the founders also feared creating an
impeachment standard so high that destructive or corrupt executives could
not be removed from office in times of great necessity. By running for
President while currently facing serious accusations of fraud and
racketeering, Trump has planted seeds for a weakened presidency even if he
prevails in the upcoming election.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the screech and din of contemporary American political discourse it
can be easy to lose sight of important legal questions. This is especially true
given Trump’s habit of saying controversial things from time to time.
Indeed, Trump has on several occasions promised to commit impeachable
crimes as a matter of executive policy. For instance, he has said that, if
elected, he would murder innocent family members of terrorism suspects 124
and order the torture of suspected criminal defendants. 125 As controversial
as these actions—both of which are likely high crimes or misdemeanors—
may be, they bear at least one important distinction with the controversy
over Trump University. Unlike his promised crimes yet to come, the illegal
acts in Trump’s high pressure wealth seminars have already occurred.
Indeed, a federal judge appointed under Article III of the U.S. Constitution
has already determined that Trump’s alleged actions, if true, constitute fraud
and racketeering.
The campaign of a major presidential candidate with pending trials for
fraud and racketeering is structurally corrosive to our system of government
because it pits two of the Republic’s most treasured values against each
other. On the one hand Americans have always believed in the electoral
process. And yet, on the other hand Americans have also always held to the
view that no one is above the law. A Trump presidency may force Congress
to choose between the two.
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